Reality

[analog57]

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analog:

Then after a moments contemplation we see that, ultimately, if everything is relational and transforms into everything else, where there are ultimately no distinctions between all aspects OF the totality, then the totality is total nothingness. Since the totality is nothingness, it cannot be an absolute, because an absolute is something, not nothing.

DQ:

If this fact is true in all possible words, then it is absolutely true. You need to face up to this and accept it.<hr>

The term "absolute" implies complete non-relationalism which cannot be the case. Reality is intrinsically relational and ultimately nothing. Yet, according to the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, we can never be absolutely certain about any physical quantity, and since David Quinn says that there is no ultimate difference between thought and reality, then we also cannot be absolutely certain about any abstract reality or principle either.

[David Quinn]

analog wrote:

Quote:Quote:<hr>The term "absolute" implies complete non-relationalism which cannot be the case.<hr> Yes, agreed, it does imply complete non-relationism. An absolute truth, for example, has no relationship to time or space. It is unchangeably true in all possible worlds. A provisional theory, by contrast, is dependent upon the existence of empirical evidence and the observer's perspective, and can thus change with the passage of time.


Quote:Quote:<hr>Reality is intrinsically relational and ultimately nothing.<hr> Yes, that is absolutely true.


Quote:Quote:<hr> Yet, according to the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, we can never be absolutely certain about any physical quantity, and since David Quinn says that there is no ultimate difference between thought and reality, then we also cannot be absolutely certain about any abstract reality or principle either. <hr> We might not be able to be certain of a thought's position or momentum, but we certainly do have the ability to determine whether it is truthful or not.


Quote:Quote:<hr> Yet, according to the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, we can never be absolutely certain about any physical quantity, and since David Quinn says that there is no ultimate difference between thought and reality, then we also cannot be absolutely certain about any abstract reality or principle either. <hr> Are you now saying you are no longer certain that Reality is relational and ultimately nothing?

[analog57]

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DQ:

Are you now saying you are no longer certain that Reality is relational and ultimately nothing?

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It can only be a hypothesis, not an absolute certainty in the universal sense. One can never be certain that absolutism holds for the totality because it cannot be known completely.


Absolute universal certainty is a logically flawed premise. Absolutes cannot be absolute in the universal sense, due to the fact that the universe[totality] can never be completely known. Is "the totality can never be completely known" an absolute statement? No. It can only be a hypothesis that survives further tests. On the other hand, absolutes can and do exist within certain well defined parameters.

For example, the statement "I think therefore I am" is absolutely true, to the person thinking the thought.

Certain truths are true by definition, within their respective domains of applicability, obviously. The absolutes are then dependent on the outer universe. They are not universally applicable.


Localized absolutes are dependent on a higher level of stratification.

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DQ:

We might not be able to be certain of a thought's position or momentum, but we certainly do have the ability to determine whether it is truthful or not.
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This appears to contradict your previous reasoning that thought is inseparable from reality. If reality is both abstract and concrete and ultimately inseparable then
a truth which is applicable for situation X is not
always applicable for situation Y.

Sure 1+1 = 2 must hold for all possible worlds right?

Certain worlds may have manifold structures where 1+1 does not always equal 2.

1+1 = 2 would not hold for all possible worlds.

Since all possible worlds can never be fully known, there can never be absolute certainty in the universal sense.

[Kevin Solway]

Quote:Quote:<hr>there can never be absolute certainty in the universal sense.<hr>

In that case, we can safely ignore your statement, since it cannot be true.

[analog57]

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DQ:

On the contrary, the philosophy of absolutism is confirmed by this fact. For it is absolutely true that everything exists in relation to everything else, that nothing exists independently.
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The philosophy of absolutism appears to be very dangerous. There can never be 100% certainty that any particular absolute holds for all possible worlds. Then again, to say that the "only certainty is uncertainty" is in itself an absolute. Of course, certain absolutes must hold for certain conclusions to remain valid. So it is possible for limited certainty to exist.

There are ways to test for truth and falsity. One way to begin testing is by explicitly assuming that the conditionals in question are contingently true, assuming absolute truth is a contradiction in the empirical case. Then one postulates a true conditional metalogic statement about the possible truth value of the consequence of the contingently true conditional under examination, to see if the antecedent of the contingently true conditional is false and predictably so. The resulting consequent conclusion of the inferential juxtaposition of the statistical enumeration wholeheartedly applies to a literal contraposition for the main assumption, which takes the inference from only possibly true assumptions to an inductively false conclusion, falsifying the premise. So the absolutes under scrutiny cannot hold in the universal sense.

[DHodges]

Quote:Quote:<hr>There are ways to test for truth and falsity. One way to begin testing is by explicitly assuming that the conditionals in question are contingently true, assuming absolute truth is a contradiction in the empirical case. Then one postulates a true conditional metalogic statement about the possible truth value of the consequence of the contingently true conditional under examination, to see if the antecedent of the contingently true conditional is false and predictably so. The resulting consequent conclusion of the inferential juxtaposition of the statistical enumeration wholeheartedly applies to a literal contraposition for the main assumption, which takes the inference from only possibly true assumptions to an inductively false conclusion, falsifying the premise. So the absolutes under scrutiny cannot hold in the universal sense.<hr>

Are you talking about Baysian statistical methods?

While Baysian approaches are generally powerful, they are applicable to situations where you are, in essence, estimating a parameter and updating prior estimates.

Unfortunately, statistical methods have no application when it comes to absolute truth.

Absolute truths are true by definition. They are tautological. You do not need to examine every possible x to recognise that x=x is true.

[Leyla Shen]

And, on the other hand, we have the linguistic tautology -- the superlative; for example:

1. any particular absolute
2. contingently true conditional
3. resulting consequent conclusion
4. statistical enumeration

Course, it could just be me.

I have no idea what the hell you are talking about, analog.

[analog57]

Yes, x=x is true by definition within its universe of applicability, which can only be a sub-universe of the totality.

[David Quinn]

analog wrote:

Quote:Quote:<hr> DQ: Are you now saying you are no longer certain that Reality is relational and ultimately nothing?

analog: It can only be a hypothesis, not an absolute certainty in the universal sense. <hr> Then, from a philosophic perspective, it is worthless.


Quote:Quote:<hr>One can never be certain that absolutism holds for the totality because it cannot be known completely.

Absolute universal certainty is a logically flawed premise. Absolutes cannot be absolute in the universal sense, due to the fact that the universe[totality] can never be completely known.<hr> What about the truth that every phenomena in existence, in every possible world, is necessarily less than the Totality? Surely, you must concede this is an absolute truth that can be known with absolute certainty and is applicable everywhere.


Quote:Quote:<hr> DQ: We might not be able to be certain of a thought's position or momentum, but we certainly do have the ability to determine whether it is truthful or not.

analog: This appears to contradict your previous reasoning that thought is inseparable from reality. If reality is both abstract and concrete and ultimately inseparable then a truth which is applicable for situation X is not always applicable for situation Y. <hr> I have no idea what you are talking about. Your statements here don't seem to make any sense.


Quote:Quote:<hr> Sure 1+1 = 2 must hold for all possible worlds right?

Certain worlds may have manifold structures where 1+1 does not always equal 2.

1+1 = 2 would not hold for all possible worlds. <hr> Not true. As an abstract truth, 1+1=2 is necessarily true in all possible worlds. As long as the current definitions of 1, 2, +, and = remain the same, it can never be falsified under any circumstances.

It doesn't matter what kind of physical structures a particular world might have, the abstraction of 1+1=2 will always remain unaffected. Even if we were transported into a world in which the physical act of adding two objects together somehow produced three objects, it still wouldn't falsify the truth of 1+1=2. All it would mean is that there was an unfamiliar physical occurance happening.

[David Quinn]

analog wrote:

Quote:Quote:<hr>Yes, x=x is true by definition within its universe of applicability, which can only be a sub-universe of the totality.<hr> I'm sure you're not aware of the hidden irony involved here. It's quite amusing.

If, for argument's sake, there existed a realm of the Totality in which X doesn't equal X (whatever that means), then it would necessarily imply that this realm differed from the rest of the Totality in which X does equal X. In other words, it would necessarily possess a different identity to the rest of the Totality. Its identity would equal its own idenity and not the identity of the rest of the Totality. That is to say, X=X would still fully apply in this realm.

Or to put it another way:

If we let "X" represent this unusual realm and "R" the rest of the Totality, then:

X doesn't equal R.

Why?

Because X=X and R=R.

Do you now see the humour inherent in your position?

Clearly, there is no part of the Totality anywhere in which X doesn't equal X. It is yet another absolute truth which can be known with absolute certainty and is applicable everywhere.

[sevens]

We could take this logic a step further:

If we assign what Analog stated with an A, and what David stated with a D, then we'd arrive at A = D. Thus, proving that X could be equivalent to a Z in another universe - if the other universe possessed the same fundamentals, but a foreign configuration.

[Leyla Shen]

Quote:Quote:<hr>If we assign what Analog stated with an A, and what David stated with a D, then we'd arrive at A = D. Thus, proving that X could be equivalent to a Z in another universe - if the other universe possessed the same fundamentals, but a foreign configuration. <hr>

OMFG, LOL! But only if A=A in all possible worlds..

[David Quinn]

sevens wrote:

Quote:Quote:<hr>If we assign what Analog stated with an A, and what David stated with a D, then we'd arrive at A = D.<hr> Why? Analog's statement isn't identical to mine. They are describing two very different views.

[sevens]

David,

You stated that X=X and R=R, which is equivalent to Analog's 'X=X is true in its universe of applicability, which is only a sub-universe of the Totality.' Both statements are essentially saying, 'X=X in a realm, which separates it from Totality. But, also, X=X can be true for other realms of the Totality, as well.' Analog's statement 'implies' this. If Analog had stated, 'X=X is ONLY true in its universe of applicability' - then the views would be opposing.

[analog57]

If Sentient agent SA justifiably believes that proposition P is true and if P implies Q, then SA is justified in believing that Q is true.


Justifiable belief[based on evidence?] implies that a particular belief is true, but being justified in believing alone, does not necessarily mean that the belief is actually true.


Anything that is radically at odds with our tidy consensus view of the universe, is labeled as crankishly absurd by defenders of the intellectual status quo[defenders of the faith?] . Consequently, non-absurdity and the verification/elimination for all possible existant beliefs, would by necessity entail complete truth, and
therefore, complete knowledge. Thus it seems that in order for any semblance of true rationality to hold, one must argue that it is not necessary to have complete truth and knowledge, but to only ask for a reasonable assurance, which is bound by a reasonable probability, in that our perceptions of reality are good guides in the quantitative
verification of the manifest, and ultimately unmanifest landscape of the perceptual universe. This entails a qualitative understanding and acceptance of our obvious human limitations.

[David Quinn]

sevens wrote:

Quote:Quote:<hr>You stated that X=X and R=R, which is equivalent to Analog's 'X=X is true in its universe of applicability, which is only a sub-universe of the Totality.' Both statements are essentially saying, 'X=X in a realm, which separates it from Totality. But, also, X=X can be true for other realms of the Totality, as well.' Analog's statement 'implies' this. If Analog had stated, 'X=X is ONLY true in its universe of applicability' - then the views would be opposing.<hr> That is exactly what he is saying. He is trying to claim that A=A may not be true in all possible worlds, which directly opposes my view on the matter.

[David Quinn]

analog wrote:

Quote:Quote:<hr>Justifiable belief[based on evidence?] implies that a particular belief is true, but being justified in believing alone, does not necessarily mean that the belief is actually true.

Anything that is radically at odds with our tidy consensus view of the universe, is labeled as crankishly absurd by defenders of the intellectual status quo[defenders of the faith?] . Consequently, non-absurdity and the verification/elimination for all possible existant beliefs, would by necessity entail complete truth, and
therefore, complete knowledge. Thus it seems that in order for any semblance of true rationality to hold, one must argue that it is not necessary to have complete truth and knowledge, but to only ask for a reasonable assurance, which is bound by a reasonable probability, in that our perceptions of reality are good guides in the quantitative
verification of the manifest, and ultimately unmanifest landscape of the perceptual universe. This entails a qualitative understanding and acceptance of our obvious human limitations.<hr> I'm not interested in these scripted responses of yours. Try addressing the actual reasoning that I gave in my post above. I showed that it was utterly impossible, anywhere, for A not to equal A. If you want to refute this reasoning, you need to come up with some counter-reasoning of your own. Simply rehashing other people's cliches and platitudes doesn't cut it.

We don't have to know every single detail in the universe in order to determine for sure that A is equal to A in all possible worlds. We only have to prove that it is utterly imposible for it to be otherwise. In the end, it doesn't matter what phenomenon you choose to use as a refutation of A=A, it will still necessarily possess an identity of some kind and hence it will still necessarily conform to A=A. There is no way around this. A=A is literally built into every thing that exists.

[Dan Rowden]

The notion that it is possible for something, somewhere, to not be what it is is one I find utterly astounding. If a thing is, it has identity, expresed in the formulation A=A.

It never ceases to amaze me how the simplest ideas can be so illusive for some people.


Dan Rowden

[David Quinn]

And elusive too.

[Matt Gregory]

Well, truth can't possibly exist, because if it did, then all the Christians and crackpots and everybody would automatically become right! And we can't have that now can we? :-D

[Leyla Shen]

Quote:Quote:<hr>This entails a qualitative understanding and acceptance of our obvious human limitations. <hr>

And this coming from one who would identify themselves with a picture of an alien, and who is yet to learn the fine art of plain English.

Yes, I would most definitely say you are with the man-is-a-fallen-God crew. Not that there's anything inherently wrong with that, of course.

[sevens]

A=A!

Late night write, bad.

[analog57]

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David Quinn:

We don't have to know every single detail in the universe in order to determine for sure that A is equal to A in all possible worlds. We only have to prove that it is utterly imposible for it to be otherwise. In the end, it doesn't matter what phenomenon you choose to use as a refutation of A=A, it will still necessarily possess an identity of some kind and hence it will still necessarily conform to A=A. There is no way around this. A=A is literally built into every thing that exists.
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David Quinn:

As an abstract truth, 1+1=2 is necessarily true in all possible worlds. As long as the current definitions of 1, 2, +, and = remain the same, it can never be falsified under any circumstances.

It doesn't matter what kind of physical structures a particular world might have, the abstraction of 1+1=2 will always remain unaffected. Even if we were transported into a world in which the physical act of adding two objects together somehow produced three objects, it still wouldn't falsify the truth of 1+1=2. All it would mean is that there was an unfamiliar physical occurance happening.
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Since you also assert that there is no ultimate difference between thought and [physical]reality, then there is also some unknown abstract principle, that somehow invalidates A=A in that specific world of all possible worlds, where 1+1 does not equal 2.

[Total]Knowledge is incomplete. One cannot be certain that any particular absolute holds for all possible worlds.

Absolutes must hold by definition for complete and closed systems of reasoning. Where knowledge is incomplete, the absolutes become provisional postulates-stipulations.

[analog57]

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Leyla Shen:


Yes, I would most definitely say you are with the man-is-a-fallen-God crew. Not that there's anything inherently wrong with that, of course.

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Your assumption is false 8o

[analog57]

One cannot claim that the whole has the same properties as the parts. It is called fallacy of composition:


<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compositio ... .l_fallacy)</a>

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A fallacy of composition arises when one infers that something is true of the whole from the fact that it is true of some part of the whole. For example: "This fragment of metal cannot be broken with a hammer, therefore the machine of which it is a part cannot be broken with a hammer." This is clearly fallacious, because many machines can be broken into their constituent parts without any of those parts being so breakable.
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