Nietszsche on Principle of Non-Contradiction

[Avicenna]

Does Nietzsche relegates principle of non-contradiction to a mere empirical generalization?

Nietzsche. Writings from the Late Notebooks. Cambridge University Press. Page. 157



9[97]



We do not succeed in both affirming and negating one and the same thing: that is a subjective empirical proposition which expresses not a ‘necessity’ but only a non-ability.



If, according to Aristotle, the principle of non-contradiction is the most certain of all principles, if it’s the final and most fundamental one upon which all proofs are based, if the principle of all other axioms lies within it: then one ought to examine all the more carefully what it actually presupposes in the way of theses. Either, as if it already knew the real from somewhere else, it asserts something with respect to the real, to what is : namely that opposite predicates cannot be ascribed to the real. Or does the principle mean that opposite predicates shall not be ascribed to it? Then logic would be an imperative, not to know the true, but to posit and arrange a world that shall be called true by us.

.

In short, the question remains open: are the axioms of logic adequate to the real, or are they measures and means to create for us the real, the concept ‘reality’? … But to be able to affirm the former one would, as I have said, already need to be acquainted with what is; and that’s simply not the case. The principle thus contains not a criterion of truth, but rather an imperative about what shall count as true.



Supposing there were no A identical with itself, such as that presupposed by every logical (including mathematical) principle, supposing A were already an illusion, then logic would have as its presupposition a merely illusory world. And indeed we believe in that principle under the impression of endless experience which seems continually to confirm it. The ‘thing’—that is the real substratum of A : our belief in things is the precondition for our belief in logic. The A of logic is, like the atom, a re-construction of the ‘thing’.. By not grasping that, and by making of logic a criterion of true being, we are well on the way to positing all those hypostases – substance, predicate, object, subject, action, etc. – as realities: i.e., to conceiving a metaphysical world, i.e., a ‘true world’ (- but this is the illusory world once again…).



The most basic acts of thought – affirming and negating, holding-to-be-true and holding-to-be-not-true – are, inasmuch as they presuppose not only a habit but a right to-hold-to-be-true or hold to-be-not-true in general, themselves ruled by a belief that there is knowledge for us, that judging really can reach the truth. In short, logic does not doubt its ability to state something about the true-in-itself (namely, that this cannot have opposite predicates).



Here the crude, sensualist prejudice reigns that sensations teach us truths about things – that I cannot say at the same time of one and the same thing that it is hard and it is soft (the instinctive proof ‘ I cannot have two opposite sensations ant the same time’ – quite crude and false) The conceptual ban on contradiction proceeds from the belief that we are able to form concepts, that a concept doesn’t merely name what is true in a thing but encompasses it…..In fact logic (like geometry and arithmetic) only applies to fictitious truths that we have created. Logic is the attempt to understand the real world according to a scheme of being that we have posited, or, more correctly, the attempt to make it formulatable, calculable for us…..

[Dan Rowden]

I'm not familiar with these quotes. Were they used in "Will to Power"? At least one of them suggests that Nietzsche did not understand the principle at all. The duality of Real and illusory has got nothing to do with A=A and non-contradiction.

[Diebert van Rhijn]

Thanks Avicenna, it's an interesting find.

The fragment seems not to be found in "Will to Power" [edit: actually it does seem to be in there: book 3, 516] but only in what's called Nietzsche's 'Nachlass', a huge body of raw notes and fragments of thoughts and ideas that is the same source his sister used to select bits and pieces from and publish "Will to Power".

This specific quote came from fragment XI: "Revaluation Book", Autumn 1997, note 97.

The duality of Real and illusory has got nothing to do with A=A and non-contradiction.

Not so sure if Nietzsche was aiming for that at all. A 'thing' has a beginning and ending, a demarcation, identity or definition - that's how we define anything in the first place. Causality shows us that 'things' do no exist at all and are all illusionary.

Nietzsche is not far away in this fragment from U.G. who said: "You can only experience dead things, not a living thing."

A=A as a principle of consciousness is true (Nietzsche doesn't deny this) but also introduces the appearance of things (identities) which can be called illusions because of the truth of causality. Another way to say this is that consciousness introduces error as well as truth, unavoidable.

I've re-translated a fragment from Nietzsche as given by Avicenna.

And indeed we believe in that principle under the weight of the never ending (sense) experiencing which seems continually to confirm it. The ‘thing’ — that is the real substratum of A: our belief in things is the condition for the faith in logic. The A of logic is, like the atom, a reverse-engineering of "whatchamacallit".

[In der That glauben wir an jenen Satz unter dem Eindruck der unendlichen Empirie, welche ihn fortwährend zu bestätigen scheint. Das "Ding" — das ist das eigentliche Substrat zu A : unser Glaube an Dinge ist die Voraussetzung für den Glauben an die Logik. Das A der Logik ist wie das Atom eine Nachconstruktion des "Dings"]

Another part taken from the translation Avicenna supplied:

In fact logic (like geometry and arithmetic) only applies to fictitious truths that we have created. Logic is the attempt to understand the real world according to a scheme of being that we have posited, or, more correctly, the attempt to make it formulatable, calculable for us…...

[Thatsächlich gilt die Logik (wie die Geometrie und Arithmetik) nur von fingirten Wahrheiten, die wir geschaffen haben. Logik ist der Versuch, nach einem von uns gesetzten Seins-Schema die wirkliche Welt zu begreifen, richtiger, uns formulirbar, berechenbar zu machen...]

Indeed this seems like a misfire from Nietzsche: 'fictitious truths' is an irrelevant phrase. Logic applies, that's all. There's no such clear line between thought and life whatever some might think.

[ExpectantlyIronic]

I'm not a big fan of Nietzsche, but the principle of non-contradiction is rather interesting. What does it mean to violate it? "There is a hamster there, and there isn't a hamster there" seems to be an incoherent statement, but it is so obviously incoherent that we should suspect that anyone saying such a thing isn't making a mistake, but rather intentionally spouting nonsense towards some unknown ends. From this fact, I can't help but gather that the principle of noncontradiction amounts to a rule of proper grammar, rather then says something about the world beyond semantics. I imagine that this was what Nietzsche was getting at.

Imagine what it would mean for something in nature to violate the principle of non-contradiction. We could say that it's impossible for something to violate it, but I think it's much more clear that it's merely unimaginable. We simply can't say what it would mean for something to violate it. Sound logic then, would seem to only deal with sentences: as we can easily imagine how a sentence can conflict with such a principle, but we cannot extend said thinking to the sensible world. It would seem that only if we imagine every sentence to have a necessary and unique referent (even if such a referent is unimaginable) can we say otherwise. Why should that be the case though? It would seem that "the hamster is there, and the hamster is not there" points to nothing without further context, or at the very least, it points to nothing discernible.

[Diebert van Rhijn]

Sound logic then, would seem to only deal with sentences: as we can easily imagine how a sentence can conflict with such a principle, but we cannot extend said thinking to the sensible world.

Perhaps your assumption here is worthy of examining more closely. Sentences, as languages, are an expression of an evolved consciousness doing its 'thing'. We experience 'life' through same consciousness including the 'sensible world'. In fact you could regard the 'sensible world' as just another language chattering into your ears, eyes or actually just your brain. It's never 'raw', it's always interpreted and massaged through association, memory, filters and so on. A more tricky language to learn to speak or understand because our subconsciousness has taken over management of most of it to save us the trouble.

[ExpectantlyIronic]

Diebert,

Perhaps your assumption here is worthy of examining more closely.

It's not an "assumption" per se, but rather an abductive inference from the available data.

Sentences, as languages, are an expression of an evolved consciousness doing its 'thing'. We experience 'life' through same consciousness including the 'sensible world'.

I'd say that languages are the result of the human desire to communicate. Language is a social thing, and it is more-or-less useless when one is in isolation. It strikes me as likely that an evolved human brain will not develop a language if cut off from communication with other humans. There is evidence to back this notion up, as people who were raised in social isolation have been known to not develop any system of communication (why would they?). This does not mean that they are cognitively impaired, it just means that they have not had a chance to learn the necessary survival techniques required to get by in our society.

In fact you could regard the 'sensible world' as just another language chattering into your ears, eyes or actually just your brain.

You could regard things as such, but why would you want to exactly? Language is obviously a part of the sensible world, so to say that the sensible world is another language, would be like saying that the sensible world is another wombat.

It's never 'raw', it's always interpreted and massaged through association, memory, filters and so on.

There are what philosophers call "raw feels" (or qualia) which simply refers to sensations as they appear in conscious experience. Like the sensation of red, cold, or sticky independent of conscious interpretation.

A more tricky language to learn to speak or understand because our subconsciousness has taken over management of most of it to save us the trouble.

I've never bought into this queer notion that we can be more conscious or less conscious in general while fully awake and caffeinated. We can have more awareness of this or that, but we neglect awareness of something else to do so. When we focus inward we are less conscious of the world around us, and when we focus outward our brain is busy processing that information so it doesn't do the associative dance through our memories that it might otherwise do.

Are you imagining there to be "subconscious" processes in the brain that are similar to those introspective thoughts that enter our consciousness? I'd say that such a view doesn't make much sense to me. Why should we be conscious of certain thoughts at some points in time, and unconscious of them in others? I'd say that it's much more clear (and scientifically supported) that we're conscious of certain processes that our brains are doing, when our brains are doing them. Research demonstrates that folks who know of Bill Clinton have a "Bill Clinton neuron" in their neocortex that fires up whenever they think of Bill Clinton. This suggests that one is not conscious or unconscious of thoughts about Bill Clinton, but either thinking or not thinking about Bill Clinton.

[Diebert van Rhijn]

Sentences, as languages, are an expression of an evolved consciousness doing its 'thing'. We experience 'life' through same consciousness including the 'sensible world'.

I'd say that languages are the result of the human desire to communicate. Language is a social thing, and it is more-or-less useless when one is in isolation.

Language, or the whole field of linguistics is just a part of semiotics, which has to do with 'how meaning occurs' in anything that is expressed.

As such it's crucial for any expression or 'movement' of consciousness itself.

In fact you could regard the 'sensible world' as just another language chattering into your ears, eyes or actually just your brain.

You could regard things as such, but why would you want to exactly? Language is obviously a part of the sensible world, so to say that the sensible world is another language, would be like saying that the sensible world is another wombat.

Isn't it obvious that our senses (through which we'd perceive your 'sensible world') only become active as processes in our nervous system and various brain functions as signs and signals? Which is a language, with its own syntax, interpretations, associations and memory functions involved, all to different degrees depending on which sense we're talking about. So I'd say your 'sensible word' could be regarded as just part of language, not the other way around since you have no way to relate to any world outside language, memory or interpretation of senses.

It's never 'raw', it's always interpreted and massaged through association, memory, filters and so on.

There are what philosophers call "raw feels" (or qualia) which simply refers to sensations as they appear in conscious experience. Like the sensation of red, cold, or sticky independent of conscious interpretation.

Some philosophers suggested some highly debated and contested idea, so what? Since we bring 'others' into this: I think Dennett dealt with this rather desperate invention rather well in his book Consciousness Explained using thought experiments.

A more tricky language to learn to speak or understand because our subconsciousness has taken over management of most of it to save us the trouble.

Are you imagining there to be "subconscious" processes in the brain that are similar to those introspective thoughts that enter our consciousness? I'd say that such a view doesn't make much sense to me. Why should we be conscious of certain thoughts at some points in time, and unconscious of them in others? I'd say that it's much more clear (and scientifically supported) that we're conscious of certain processes that our brains are doing, when our brains are doing them. Research demonstrates that folks who know of Bill Clinton have a "Bill Clinton neuron" in their neocortex that fires up whenever they think of Bill Clinton. This suggests that one is not conscious or unconscious of thoughts about Bill Clinton, but either thinking or not thinking about Bill Clinton.

I didn't try to suggest that there are any 'subconscious thoughts' lurking since I'd define a thought as a specific conscious process in itself. But the content of our subconsciousness can certainly be brought under our attention, even while it will be perhaps at times in some indirect manner. I have difficulty with the common usage of the word 'unconscious' since it points basically to that what is not conscious and becomes a catch-all for things not understood or further described yet. It's a combination of unexplored subconscious processes and the multitude of external causes working on our mind. It's a bit too vague in terms of location and nature to use, even while much of the psychological literature loves to bring it up.

[ExpectantlyIronic]

Diebert,

Language, or the whole field of linguistics is just a part of semiotics, which has to do with 'how meaning occurs' in anything that is expressed.

Which would be fantastic if we were talking about semiotics. We weren't. I think the term "language" was being used quite clearly.

Isn't it obvious that our senses (through which we'd perceive your 'sensible world') only become active as processes in our nervous system and various brain functions as signs and signals?

Brain functions and the nervous system are also part of the sensible world. So, even if I were using the term "language" in such an unspecific manner, your point still wouldn't hold water.

Which is a language, with its own syntax, interpretations, associations and memory functions involved, all to different degrees depending on which sense we're talking about.

You can call it language if you like. Needless to say, that isn't the sort of language I was talking about. Those cognitive functions that are responsible for processing sentences are a subset of the set of all cognitive functions. What's true for the subset need not be true for the whole set.

So I'd say your 'sensible word' could be regarded as just part of language, not the other way around since you have no way to relate to any world outside language, memory or interpretation of senses.

The world which is then presented to me by those things is the sensible world. How do I know of language? I know of it because it is part of the sensible world. How do you know of any of the things which you use to make your argument? The sensible world (and inferences drawn from it).

Since we bring 'others' into this: I think Dennett dealt with this rather desperate invention rather well in his book Consciousness Explained using thought experiments.

I've read Consciousness Explained, and find Dennett's position to be satisfactorily refuted by Chalmers papers Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness and Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness.

But the content of our subconsciousness can certainly be brought under our attention, even while it will be perhaps at times in some indirect manner.

We can draw inferences about what subconscious processes might be occurring in our brain, but why then say that we are conscious of what we were not before? It would seem that we aren't more conscious of anything. We've just inferred things to be true that may or not be the case.

[Diebert van Rhijn]

Diebert,

Language, or the whole field of linguistics is just a part of semiotics, which has to do with 'how meaning occurs' in anything that is expressed.

Which would be fantastic if we were talking about semiotics. We weren't. I think the term "language" was being used quite clearly.

If you'd read back you'll see I wasn't just talking about language really (sentences, as languages, are an expression of an evolved consciousness doing its 'thing). Apart from that it's quite hard to pinpoint the differences between semiotics, linguistics or even philosophy of language. It boils down to how one defines 'sign' really. This touches briefly on the relations between sign, signal, meaning and consciousness, which would make this go off-topic quite a bit.

Isn't it obvious that our senses (through which we'd perceive your 'sensible world') only become active as processes in our nervous system and various brain functions as signs and signals?

Brain functions and the nervous system are also part of the sensible world. So, even if I were using the term "language" in such an unspecific manner, your point still wouldn't hold water.

I think it's time you define 'sensible world' to me. It doesn't make any sense to me. Do you mean a material world outside our heads?

Which is a language, with its own syntax, interpretations, associations and memory functions involved, all to different degrees depending on which sense we're talking about.

You can call it language if you like. Needless to say, that isn't the sort of language I was talking about. Those cognitive functions that are responsible for processing sentences are a subset of the set of all cognitive functions. What's true for the subset need not be true for the whole set.

To my knowledge there's no such subset if it comes to the functioning of the brain in regards to the complete processing and understanding of a sentence. Could you describe it for me?

So I'd say your 'sensible word' could be regarded as just part of language, not the other way around since you have no way to relate to any world outside language, memory or interpretation of senses.

The world which is then presented to me by those things is the sensible world. How do I know of language? I know of it because it is part of the sensible world. How do you know of any of the things which you use to make your argument? The sensible world (and inferences drawn from it).

Since you cannot know of any property of this 'sensible world' without using your cognitive functions, it becomes a chicken or egg dilemma. This is why it's said the world arises when we're born and seizes when we die. All inferring and deducing remains provisional.

Since we bring 'others' into this: I think Dennett dealt with this rather desperate invention rather well in his book Consciousness Explained using thought experiments.

I've read Consciousness Explained, and find Dennett's position to be satisfactorily refuted by Chalmers papers Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness and Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness.

I've to read this first. Not that I'm very interested in bringing the thought of other people into this discussion. It would show some guts if you could summarize the essence, explain why you align yourself with it and point out the relevance to this discussion in more detail. Just introducing "raw feels" as a given doesn't cut it.

But the content of our subconsciousness can certainly be brought under our attention, even while it will be perhaps at times in some indirect manner.

We can draw inferences about what subconscious processes might be occurring in our brain, but why then say that we are conscious of what we were not before? It would seem that we aren't more conscious of anything. We've just inferred things to be true that may or not be the case.

With that line of thought you easily end up with the final conclusion we can't be conscious of anything at all! Your whole inferred 'sensible world' might not be the case as well. So are we conscious of this world or not? Why?

[ExpectantlyIronic]

Diebert,

If you'd read back you'll see I wasn't just talking about language really (sentences, as languages, are an expression of an evolved consciousness doing its 'thing).

Fair enough.

I think it's time you define 'sensible world' to me. It doesn't make any sense to me. Do you mean a material world outside our heads?

I'm talking about the world as it appears to us in our heads (and as it exists outside of it really, depending on how you want to look at things). The world that we perceive. It's what someone with complete sensory deprivation from birth would have no knowledge of (of course, they wouldn't have knowledge of anything, but that's really my point).

To my knowledge there's no such subset if it comes to the functioning of the brain in regards to the complete processing and understanding of a sentence. Could you describe it for me?

Sure. The neocortex basically just has a handful of algorithms for anything it might do, so I'm not saying that it executes a special algorithm when dealing with sentence. What I am saying is that we've got in our memory those sounds and scribbles which compose words, the various other sensations they are associated with, and other sensations that aren't necessarily automatically associated with words.

Since you cannot know of any property of this 'sensible world' without using your cognitive functions, it becomes a chicken or egg dilemma. This is why it's said the world arises when we're born and seizes when we die. All inferring and deducing remains provisional.

The point I'm trying to make is that tautologies are ultimately dependent upon the sensible world for their truth value, as they do not exist without language, and language is learned from observation (as is near everything we know).

It would show some guts if you could summarize the essence, explain why you align yourself with it and point out the relevance to this discussion in more detail. Just introducing "raw feels" as a given doesn't cut it.

The topic isn't incredibly relevant to this discussion, and is complicated enough to deserve its own thread. I might start one at some point, but for the moment we can just shelve it.

With that line of thought you easily end up with the final conclusion we can't be conscious of anything at all! Your whole inferred 'sensible world' might not be the case as well. So are we conscious of this world or not? Why?

I use the term consciousness to refer to experience. When we experience something, we are conscious of it. I can say that I'm conscious of what I imagine my subconscious processes to be like if I am thinking about them, but I am not conscious of the processes themselves. That's basically what I'm getting at.

[Diebert van Rhijn]

I'm talking about the world as it appears to us in our heads (and as it exists outside of it really, depending on how you want to look at things). The world that we perceive. It's what someone with complete sensory deprivation from birth would have no knowledge of (of course, they wouldn't have knowledge of anything, but that's really my point).

There's an interesting contradiction in asserting a 'someone' with no sense information at all. It implies some unemployed never used machinery waiting for 'input'. In reality this machinery is constructed by input. In other words: someone becomes existent through the billions of signals, no matter their origin. Even when blocking the five senses their will still be the millions of more subtle feedbacks from the organs, the blood flow, the nerve ends, etc. And whole world could be constructed out of that, one without much in common with the world we create with our five senses, leading to us concluding this being having 'no knowledge'. It's fun to think about it, I just hope there haven't been real experiments. There are these well documented cases of internal 'twins' surviving inside adult people as parasite, feeding of them but that's the closest it got. They never got one to survive after removing. Would they dream?

The point I'm trying to make is that tautologies are ultimately dependent upon the sensible world for their truth value, as they do not exist without language, and language is learned from observation (as is near everything we know).

Human observation has some more requirements to even work. A camera could be said to observe stand-alone something but there's no truth value in that.

One could also say some tautologies describe a fundamental quality of truth or its valuing.

I use the term consciousness to refer to experience. When we experience something, we are conscious of it. I can say that I'm conscious of what I imagine my subconscious processes to be like if I am thinking about them, but I am not conscious of the processes themselves. That's basically what I'm getting at.

Okay. But of course the moment a subconscious process would be observed it's technical not anymore subconscious at that moment. If I turn down the stereo and the computer I can hear distinctly the background humming of the fridge, a bird outside and distant traffic. If I keep listening a hundreds of other sounds may pop up. They're not anymore background sounds at that moment. Some sounds might require a lot of training, or cleaner ears, to pick up and others will never be distinguished by most, depending on genetics, shooting guns and so on. One couldn't function that way if one could hear another person's heartbeat loud and clear while at the same time having a conversation. But when it's needed there are ways to examine even these sounds with more than just imagination.

[ExpectantlyIronic]

In other words: someone becomes existent through the billions of signals, no matter their origin.

Sure. I only used the term "someone" in the manner that I did to convey a point.

Even when blocking the five senses their will still be the millions of more subtle feedbacks from the organs, the blood flow, the nerve ends, etc.

I consider such things to be part of the senses really.

One could also say some tautologies describe a fundamental quality of truth or its valuing.

I'll grant that a study of tautological propositions and logic in general is necessary in order to develop a solid theory of truth, but I think any such theory that pretends at being logically validated by being tautological will be necessarily ultimately hollow. In fact, the more I think about it, the more useless I think the whole "true/false" dichotomy is. Terms such as "truth" play an important role in interpersonal communication, but I'm more interested in a propositions descriptive power qua philosopher. We could say that truth is then descriptive power, and end up with something along the lines of correspondence theory, but such a thing doesn't seem to have a whole lot of descriptive power itself. Furthermore, saying that "truth" is anything beyond everything that the term is used to do seems rather silly.

Okay. But of course the moment a subconscious process would be observed it's technical not anymore subconscious at that moment.

I think we use the term "subconscious" differently. I understand the subconscious to be those mechanical functions of the brain that I don't imagine correspond in a significant way to what gets experienced. Activity in my brain causes my eyes to saccade, but I don't have an experience I would call "making my eyes saccade". I am not conscious (in the sense of the term I'm using) of such a thing even though I'm aware that it happens. The term "conscious" is used in a lot of very different ways--to describe wakefulness, awareness, experience, etc--and I think that we, as folks interested in such things, need to be careful that we don't fool ourselves into thinking that the very different things the term describes are more interrelated then is apparent.

[Diebert van Rhijn]

In other words: someone becomes existent through the billions of signals, no matter their origin.

Sure. I only used the term "someone" in the manner that I did to convey a point.

Even when blocking the five senses their will still be the millions of more subtle feedbacks from the organs, the blood flow, the nerve ends, etc.

I consider such things to be part of the senses really.

That's why I said the idea of someone with complete sensory deprivation from birth is a contradiction. There's no relevant signaling without feedback, which would cause sense. Which means that the idea of having 'knowledge' of a 'sensible world' becomes contradiction as well. Knowledge is this world including ourselves. This is why I wrote that your 'sensible world' could be called language as long as language is seen as an exponent of knowing or being conscious.

One could also say some tautologies describe a fundamental quality of truth or its valuing.

I'll grant that a study of tautological propositions and logic in general is necessary in order to develop a solid theory of truth, but I think any such theory that pretends at being logically validated by being tautological will be necessarily ultimately hollow.

Being tautological is just one of the necessary qualities of such "theory of truth". Just like questioning it becomes "begging the question". You're close to fallacy of composition here. A logical validation is not possible in the same system, by definition. The only validation is a form of self-evidence stemming from a higher order system, which one could define as 'truth'.

Furthermore, saying that "truth" is anything beyond everything that the term is used to do seems rather silly.

As it is with all words. But when the term 'truth' is used specifically to describe "descriptive power" then that's what it does. Why even hint at a beyond?

I understand the subconscious to be those mechanical functions of the brain that I don't imagine correspond in a significant way to what gets experienced. Activity in my brain causes my eyes to saccade, but I don't have an experience I would call "making my eyes saccade". I am not conscious (in the sense of the term I'm using) of such a thing even though I'm aware that it happens

You don't have an experience of "making eyes saccade" simply because it's a smaller part of the whole visual process which in its totality we're experiencing as sight. It's certainly not a sensory input of some kind in itself so the idea of 'not corresponding' with what gets experienced is really pointless.

Actually one could say that the saccades are an important cause to have a visual experience. But what do our experiences 'correspond' with anyway? There's never a direct or raw kind of transfer between some mechanical event in or outside or brains and our experiencing. This is not what experiencing is about. The way you define it, causality prevents of having ever a 'conscious' experience, since we never can experience the whole infinite web of causes.

[ExpectantlyIronic]

Diebert,

That's why I said the idea of someone with complete sensory deprivation from birth is a contradiction.

It's a thought experiment. Your supposed to try to picture it in your head. It's an outlandish notion, of course, which is exactly my point.

Which means that the idea of having 'knowledge' of a 'sensible world' becomes contradiction as well. Knowledge is this world including ourselves. This is why I wrote that your 'sensible world' could be called language as long as language is seen as an exponent of knowing or being conscious.

I don't think it's helpful at all to say that "knowledge is this world". We don't call an apple knowledge. What we call knowledge is a true belief about an apple. The sensible world is simply the bullet that kills you regardless of what you think its ontological status to be. It's the apple that you pick up, smell, and taste. It's quite different from one's idea of something. I do not see how the taste of an apple has anything to do with language, unless you warp the standard definition of language beyond all comprehensibility. I think you're struggling here to make a rather pointless point. Language is what we use to communicate with other people.

Being tautological is just one of the necessary qualities of such "theory of truth".

All tautological statements are considered to be begging the question, as they don't provide an explanation for anything insofar as they remain tautologies. Thus, you can't explain what the term "truth" is used to do by using purely tautological statements. You have to inductively infer such a thing from observations.

But what do our experiences 'correspond' with anyway? There's never a direct or raw kind of transfer between some mechanical event in or outside or brains and our experiencing.

Research has demonstrated that there is a correspondence between the firing of particular neurons and what an individual will report to be experiencing. Thus, there is a correspondence between phenomenal experience and the physical states of the brain. The fact that one can't demonstrate how one a priori causes the other doesn't have any significance when the correspondence can be demonstrated a posteriori.

The way you define it, causality prevents of having ever a 'conscious' experience, since we never can experience the whole infinite web of causes.

I have no idea what you're getting at with this. Nobody can provide a convincing explanation of why we should experience anything. In fact, there seems to be no reason that we should at all. Nevertheless, we do experience things, and such experiences do correspond with brain states, so there you have it. One does not need to be able to fathom a theoretical causative mechanism for something in order to allow for its existence. If a planet were clearly observed to be in an extremely close orbit around the sun, and such a thing defied all logic and previous observations as to what can occur, it is still there. Existence before essence.

[ExpectantlyIronic]

It should be noted that Zeno offered up several convincing logical demonstrations of why there can be no motion. Insofar as we consider there to be essential facts about reality that can discovered through reason, there is little reason to automatically disqualify such conclusions. I find such a notion, though, utterly absurd, and would bet my life on the existence of motion. I do not, on the other hand, believe in such things as a necessary infinite causative web, as I see no reason to suspect that any state of affairs is essential to any other. I think it quite likely that things can simply happen with no knowable reason.

[Jason]

and would bet my life on the existence of motion.

Well if you're wrong the motions necessary to take your life wouldn't be possible. Win-win situation.

[HUNTEDvsINVIS]

Just playing. I couldn't sleep... Forgive me.

We can only know things if we compare them to their opposites or other things. The only thing that gives anything a significant characteristic is the existence of another thing. Nothing can inherently be valuable or have a characteristic. The only reason we question the existence of one thing is because of the presence of the existence of the other. Imagine you are in a world where everything is white. The fact that everything is white becomes completely irrelevant. Only when you go to a black and white world white becomes a valuable characteristic. The only reason we imagine the world may have been created from nothingness is because we have experienced nothingness ( via sleep and the state before birth ). If we never slept or forgot that we were born from nothingness we would not question the possibility that everything might have arisen from nothing. We would also not even have the concept of everything/infinity because it is not necessary and because we have nothing to compare it to. The only things we question are those that have opposites. Each opposite in turn makes us question the other. Opposites give truth or existence to everything, they make truth relevant and something we want to puzzle out. The law of the universe is that the effects of everything amounts to nothing. Take earth for example the existence of earth. This small unique ball with an abundance of wiggling and whirling life forms is directly countered or nullified by the existence of its opposition: the existence of a vast, massive lifeless dead universe full of not-so-unique balls and rocks and stars ( and space junk, how wonderful ). Everything can only be known because of the opposite. And yet the opposite that gives the characteristics also steals and kills the characteristics in the grand scheme of things. Everything is neutral as the alkaline and the acid balance to give the PH of water. Perception is the balance point between everything and nothing. It is where they flow together to render everything, ultimately, useless. Paradoxes give rise to nothingness, and everything is a paradox. The biggest intellectual problem imaginable is where matter came from. I am working on it, being the stubborn little person that I am. But of course finding out will probably only nullify things further. Anyway, the universe operates to produce "super-nothingness" in order to clarify itself completely non-real and inexplicable, by existing completely in paradoxical form. The existence of nothingness itself ( the mere absence of matter or sensory perception ) is a thing that exists. The universe thus cancels this existence out by means of the extreme opposite of the existence of everything. You will say how is this still possible to make this mechanism in the first place? I don't know but being what it is the universe will place complete understanding and a complete lack thereof next to each other, to render even this impossible. Thus we may never understand. All I know is that this harmony of balance is something the universe is desperate for in order to render nothing real and nothing unreal. The Super-nothingness. Hence nothing can be proved or unproved at its roots. A thing can only be sickeningly and completely REAL and unquestionable if it has no opposite to the human brain. We are like the brain of the universe itself...establishing for itself that none can be real and none unreal. The human brain or perception knows everything and nothing, causing everything to not matter and not be possible. Even impossibility is impossible, I suspect. Everything works in harmony to prove everything else both real and unreal, hence we approach the super-zero of not nothingness or everything existing.

Also mind works in direct opposition to matter. rendering both useless, stupid, indefinable.

[Diebert van Rhijn]

I do not see how the taste of an apple has anything to do with language, unless you warp the standard definition of language beyond all comprehensibility....Language is what we use to communicate with other people.

So now you're purposefully, while knowing the greater scope I have been referring to, severely limiting the definition of language to render my argument pointless?

All tautological statements are considered to be begging the question, as they don't provide an explanation for anything insofar as they remain tautologies.

No, you got that wrong. Such statements never 'beg the question' since they're not asking nor answering anything. Neither are they meant to explain specifics - they just set the stage when they're stated as axioms or underlying assumption.

Thus, you can't explain what the term "truth" is used to do by using purely tautological statements. You have to inductively infer such a thing from observations.

Mostly inductive reasoning, not pure tautological statements, is what would bring you to a pure tautological statement explaining truth.

The way you define it, causality prevents of having ever a 'conscious' experience, since we never can experience the whole infinite web of causes.

I have no idea what you're getting at with this. Nobody can provide a convincing explanation of why we should experience anything.

I was only following your own reasoning to show how contradicting it was. Perhaps I was not clear. You defined a conscious experience as a significant correspondence between mechanical functions of the brain and that what gets experienced, as opposed to subconsciousness which would be those functions we do not experience. Okay?

It would seem that all of our 'conscious' experiences contain countless of elements that are in our 'subconscious' (in your definition), or in other words: our conscious experiences are formed of a manifold 'subconscious' elements. So it's a matter of composition which suggests that consciousness is not in even the same category as subconsciousness. But you are stating they are both 'mechanical processes': one that leads to some experience for us, and others which aren't leading to them or not having any 'direct' linkage.

But this discussion was initially about bringing subconscious elements into consciousness. And your remark about our experiencing of such a subconscious process not really being the same as being conscious of them, but would only be some kind of "thinking" about them.

And my point then would be: there's no difference between the nature of consciousness of some thing or sense, and thinking about it. When you experience pain, you're having a simple thought, a rather undefined blob of impression with several build-in associations and reflexes attached. A complex thought is just the same, but more refined, more detached, clear, sober, more skilled than merely being overwhelmed by an impression, being it pleasure or pain.

This is also why genius is said to be an infinite capacity for giving pains (Oscar Wilde). Birth pangs of greater thoughts.

[Diebert van Rhijn]

Also mind works in direct opposition to matter. rendering both useless, stupid, indefinable.

This is most commonly understood as the problem of spirit vs matter, fire and water. The mind is just stuck in between - a rock and a hard place, and becomes dumb founded.

All uselessness, stupidness and undefinabilities are merely in our mind. As are their counterparts. So what's new?