Oh why, why, why?!?!??!!!

[guest_of_logic]

Your position, David, is much as I expected it to be based on my conversations with Kevin. In my most recent conversation with him on this topic, I found it very difficult to put words to my own position, but I'll give it a go here. You write that "the resolution of the issue lies in the false assumptions that the question makes. In particular, the assumption that each subjective consciousness is identical and interchangeable. But just as no two leaves are ever alike, so too no subjective consciousnesses are ever alike. Each is peculiar to the particular circumstances from which it arises."

Thus you deny the interchangeability of subjective consciousness. Let's look at this a little more closely, though. It seems to me that there is an essence to our consciousness that never changes, and that might be interchangeable bodily: this, though, is the bit that's very hard to put into words. Perhaps the best way to put it is that it is "the subjectivity of our personal perspective, stripped of all personality, thoughts, memory and belief"; another phrasing is that it is the "looking out from our perspective"-ness which forms the essence of what we mean when we say "I". That this essence is "stripped of all personality, thought, memory and belief" can be demonstrated in at least two ways, one of which is an observation and one of which is a thought experiment.

The first demonstration is to observe that, as the house philosophers, or at least Kevin, maintain, the self is not the same from moment to moment - it is constantly changing, and this includes "personality, thoughts, memory and belief". This change does not, however, pertain to the essence to which I referred: consistent throughout our experience is this subjective "I" which "looks out" from "my" perspective; this essence of subjectivity. Thus, our experience is that whilst all else about us changes, our essential subjective "inhabitance" remains the same: this essence of subjectivity (what at its heart we mean by references to "me" or "I") is one which we could imagine "looking out" from the perspective of another human being; "clothed" in that other human being's personality, thoughts, memory and belief.

The second demonstration, a thought experiment, merely emphasises what is observed in the first demonstration: imagine a person, named for the sake of convenience, "Target", defined at a moment of time, t0, by a certain "form", including a personality, set of thoughts, memories and beliefs, and a certain body. Now imagine that prior to t0, slowly, over time, piece by piece of you (body, brain and mind) has been replaced using advanced future technology, such that at exactly t0, you are identical in all respects to Target - in your personality, thoughts, memory, belief and body: the only respect in which you differ is in your physical location. Since the changes have been gradual and piece by piece, there has been no point at which the continuity of your subjective experience has been interrupted (this assumes that there is no physical Cartesian centre of consciousness in the brain which, upon being changed, alters the essential "inhabiting" subjectivity, but given the position of the house philosophy, this seems to be a safe assumption).

Now, despite a complete congruence of identity (other than physical location), there are nevertheless two separate subjectivities of "inhabited perspective" associated with these two separate identities; and, moreover, the subjectivity of inhabited perspective associated with "the new you" is identical with the subjectivity of inhabited perspective associated with "the old you".

This thought experiment demonstrates that the association of the subjectivity of consciousness with a physical form depends on more than merely the identity/properties of that physical form, and, like the first observation, demonstrates that the same subjectivity of perspective can "inhabit" two entirely different human forms.

Thus, to the original question that I posed, "Is it possible for my subjective consciousness to have resided in a different body?", it seems that the answer is, "Yes". As, then, to your original question, which is the WHY of it being in this particular body - with the additional consideration given what I've outlined in this post that it could (have) be(en) in another - I have no knowledgeable answer. Your own "at root" answer of "causation" is both trite and banal, and not all that much different from saying, "Because of some reason". I hope that we can do better than that.

[David Quinn]

Your position, David, is much as I expected it to be based on my conversations with Kevin. In my most recent conversation with him on this topic, I found it very difficult to put words to my own position, but I'll give it a go here. You write that "the resolution of the issue lies in the false assumptions that the question makes. In particular, the assumption that each subjective consciousness is identical and interchangeable. But just as no two leaves are ever alike, so too no subjective consciousnesses are ever alike. Each is peculiar to the particular circumstances from which it arises."

Thus you deny the interchangeability of subjective consciousness. Let's look at this a little more closely, though. It seems to me that there is an essence to our consciousness that never changes, and that might be interchangeable bodily: this, though, is the bit that's very hard to put into words. Perhaps the best way to put it is that it is "the subjectivity of our personal perspective, stripped of all personality, thoughts, memory and belief"; another phrasing is that it is the "looking out from our perspective"-ness which forms the essence of what we mean when we say "I". That this essence is "stripped of all personality, thought, memory and belief" can be demonstrated in at least two ways, one of which is an observation and one of which is a thought experiment.

The first demonstration is to observe that, as the house philosophers, or at least Kevin, maintain, the self is not the same from moment to moment - it is constantly changing, and this includes "personality, thoughts, memory and belief". This change does not, however, pertain to the essence to which I referred: consistent throughout our experience is this subjective "I" which "looks out" from "my" perspective; this essence of subjectivity. Thus, our experience is that whilst all else about us changes, our essential subjective "inhabitance" remains the same: this essence of subjectivity (what at its heart we mean by references to "me" or "I") is one which we could imagine "looking out" from the perspective of another human being; "clothed" in that other human being's personality, thoughts, memory and belief.

You're falling victim to the mind's ability to abstract things away. What you call the "I" is a particular kind of thought, momentarily fired up on a frequent basis, which creates the illusion of something unchanging due to the fact that all content has been abstracted away.

The second demonstration, a thought experiment, merely emphasises what is observed in the first demonstration: imagine a person, named for the sake of convenience, "Target", defined at a moment of time, t0, by a certain "form", including a personality, set of thoughts, memories and beliefs, and a certain body. Now imagine that prior to t0, slowly, over time, piece by piece of you (body, brain and mind) has been replaced using advanced future technology, such that at exactly t0, you are identical in all respects to Target - in your personality, thoughts, memory, belief and body: the only respect in which you differ is in your physical location. Since the changes have been gradual and piece by piece, there has been no point at which the continuity of your subjective experience has been interrupted.

Now, despite a complete congruence of identity (other than physical location), there are nevertheless two separate subjectivities of "inhabited perspective" associated with these two separate identities; and, moreover, the subjectivity of inhabited perspective associated with "the new you" is identical with the subjectivity of inhabited perspective associated with "the old you".

This thought experiment demonstrates that the association of the subjectivity of consciousness with a physical form depends on more than merely the identity/properties of that physical form, and, like the first observation, demonstrates that the same subjectivity of perspective can "inhabit" two entirely different human forms.

This thought-experiment is poorly-conceived because it doesn't really demonstrate what you want it to demonstrate. A radio can be left turned on so that a constant hissing sound emanates from it and then all of its parts can be gradually exchanged by new ones without the hissing sound ever being interrupted. It doesn't mean that the hissing sound has an unchanging essence.

Similarly, a spurt of water issuing upwards uninterruptedly with the parts of the fountain gradually being changed, or a blank desktop background on a computer screen shinging uninterrupetdly while all the computer parts are gradually changed, likewise doesn't demonstrate the existence of an unchanging essence.

Thus, to the original question that I posed, "Is it possible for my subjective consciousness to have resided in a different body?", it seems that the answer is, "Yes".

This part is true, but only in the sense that the ever-changing flow of the self can theoretically be transferred to a new body in the way that you describe. A bit like how a flame can be transferred from one candle to another.

As, then, to your original question, which is the WHY of it being in this particular body - with the additional consideration given what I've outlined in this post that it could (have) be(en) in another - I have no knowledgeable answer. Your own "at root" answer of "causation" is both trite and banal, and not all that much different from saying, "Because of some reason". I hope that we can do better than that.

Oh yes, God is indeed trite and banal to those who are in love with their own soap-opera. He is everything that the soap-opera is not.

Rather than trying to come up with these bizarre convoluted attempts to deny reality, you really should give more focus to your own motivations in all of this - in particular, to your ego's desire to seek its own permanence.


-

[guest_of_logic]

What you call the "I" is a particular kind of thought, momentarily fired up on a frequent basis, which creates the illusion of something unchanging due to the fact that all content has been abstracted away.

You're ignoring the reality of the "I", which is not disembodied thought, but the essence of subjectivity. At heart, what we refer to by "I" is this subjective essence, and not a mere thought of that essence; thoughts, are experienced by/in that subjectivity.

This thought-experiment is poorly-conceived because it doesn't really demonstrate what you want it to demonstrate. A radio can be left turned on so that a constant hissing sound emanates from it and then all of its parts can be gradually exchanged by new ones without the hissing sound ever being interrupted. It doesn't mean that the hissing sound has an unchanging essence.

Similarly, a spurt of water issuing upwards uninterruptedly with the parts of the fountain gradually being changed, or a blank desktop background on a computer screen shinging uninterrupetdly while all the computer parts are gradually changed, likewise doesn't demonstrate the existence of an unchanging essence.

Your objections fail, because they are based on undifferentiable, impersonal identities; whereas this does not apply to consciousness: it is impossible to differentiate the essential identity of one hiss that sounds a certain way from any other hiss that sounds the same; moreover, and which is another perspective on what I'm trying to say, it is impossible to be, in a subjectively conscious sense, that hiss. Likewise, it is impossible to differentiate the essential identity of a spurt of water issuing upwards from any other spurt of water issuing upwards; moreover, it is impossible to be, in a subjectively conscious sense, that spurt of water.

Conversely, the essential subjectivity of consciousness is marked by its unique identity: its personal beingness, the looking-outness of its "I", as distinct from the looking-outness of the "I" of another body. So, whilst we can exchange any impersonal, undifferentiated hiss with any other impersonal, undifferentiated hiss, and not make or notice any difference, the same is not true for the subjectivity of consciousness: to exchange the personal subjectivity of the consciousness of one body/mind for that of another body/mind is to fundamentally change the identity and referent of the "I".

Laird: Thus, to the original question that I posed, "Is it possible for my subjective consciousness to have resided in a different body?", it seems that the answer is, "Yes".

David: This part is true, but only in the sense that the ever-changing flow of the self can theoretically be transferred to a new body in the way that you describe. A bit like how a flame can be transferred from one candle to another.

Why "only" in that sense? Why not in the broader sense in which, from the very start (rather than having to be transferred), the essence of the subjectivity of my consciousness resided in a different body?

Moreover, your metaphor of the flame is flawed, for the reasons that I indicated above: a flame does not have a personal, subjective identity; one flame's essential identity is interchangeable (without effect) with the essential identity of any other flame.

In that light, it's interesting to note that the subjectivity of consciousness can be utterly "extinguished", and then "relit", such that the same "flame" burns: that same essential subjective identity - which I've referred to as the "looking out from a perspective"-ness of consciousness; the heart and soul of what we mean when we refer to "myself" - once again inhabits the same body after being "extinguished" from it. I'm referring here to general anaesthesia, in which consciousness is "evicted" from the body and then "returns" to it. In this case, the consistency of the essential subjectivity of consciousness is not being maintained like a flame: it seems that it must be associated with the body through some other means.

Laird: Your own "at root" answer of "causation" is both trite and banal, and not all that much different from saying, "Because of some reason". I hope that we can do better than that.

David: Oh yes, God is indeed trite and banal to those who are in love with their own soap-opera.

Two points: firstly, I was referring to your answer, in context, and not to causation in and of itself (way to twist what I said for rhetorical purposes, but then, twisted, grandiose rhetoric is your specialty); secondly, I don't accept your definition of God, and moreover, I contend that you adopt religious language to lend an air of credibility to your pontifications - you sex it up like this by twisting religious language to conform to your materialistic philosophy, because that way it sounds a lot more profound than it really is.

[David Quinn]

What you call the "I" is a particular kind of thought, momentarily fired up on a frequent basis, which creates the illusion of something unchanging due to the fact that all content has been abstracted away.

You're ignoring the reality of the "I", which is not disembodied thought, but the essence of subjectivity. At heart, what we refer to by "I" is this subjective essence, and not a mere thought of that essence; thoughts, are experienced by/in that subjectivity.

If you examine your own mind carefully, you will see that the "I" only comes into existence when it is thought into being. And in your case, it evidentally also involves a further projecting of this "I" onto all experiences.

At root, there is no such thing as subjectivity, just as there is no such thing as objectivity.

This thought-experiment is poorly-conceived because it doesn't really demonstrate what you want it to demonstrate. A radio can be left turned on so that a constant hissing sound emanates from it and then all of its parts can be gradually exchanged by new ones without the hissing sound ever being interrupted. It doesn't mean that the hissing sound has an unchanging essence.

Similarly, a spurt of water issuing upwards uninterruptedly with the parts of the fountain gradually being changed, or a blank desktop background on a computer screen shinging uninterrupetdly while all the computer parts are gradually changed, likewise doesn't demonstrate the existence of an unchanging essence.

Your objections fail, because they are based on undifferentiable, impersonal identities; whereas this does not apply to consciousness: it is impossible to differentiate the essential identity of one hiss that sounds a certain way from any other hiss that sounds the same; moreover, and which is another perspective on what I'm trying to say, it is impossible to be, in a subjectively conscious sense, that hiss. Likewise, it is impossible to differentiate the essential identity of a spurt of water issuing upwards from any other spurt of water issuing upwards; moreover, it is impossible to be, in a subjectively conscious sense, that spurt of water.

I have no idea what you are talking about. Given the context of this discussion, how are two hisses from two different radios not like two subjective consciousness from two different bodies?

Conversely, the essential subjectivity of consciousness is marked by its unique identity: its personal beingness, the looking-outness of its "I", as distinct from the looking-outness of the "I" of another body. So, whilst we can exchange any impersonal, undifferentiated hiss with any other impersonal, undifferentiated hiss, and not make or notice any difference, the same is not true for the subjectivity of consciousness: to exchange the personal subjectivity of the consciousness of one body/mind for that of another body/mind is to fundamentally change the identity and referent of the "I".

Nope, still no idea what you are talking about. You need to determine exactly what you want the "I" to mean. If it means pure subjective awareness (as distinct from all objects of consciousness), then it wouldn't matter in the slightest if two of them exchanged bodies. No one would know any difference. The "I", in this sense, is indeed utterly impersonal.

However, the issue you are raising here and your conception of "personal being" suggests a different conception of "I" - namely, subjective awareness combined with the memories of the person involved. Either that or you seem to be imagining that a person's sense of identity comes from something other than his memories.

Laird: Your own "at root" answer of "causation" is both trite and banal, and not all that much different from saying, "Because of some reason". I hope that we can do better than that.

David: Oh yes, God is indeed trite and banal to those who are in love with their own soap-opera.

Two points: firstly, I was referring to your answer, in context, and not to causation in and of itself (way to twist what I said for rhetorical purposes, but then, twisted, grandiose rhetoric is your specialty); secondly, I don't accept your definition of God, and moreover, I contend that you adopt religious language to lend an air of credibility to your pontifications - you sex it up like this by twisting religious language to conform to your materialistic philosophy, because that way it sounds a lot more profound than it really is.

Contend away, if that is what you want to do, but know that my outlook and my wisdom harbours not the slightest trace of materialism.

-

[Kunga]

Ancient Chinese wisdom says :

The other person is right ...you are wrong

[jupiviv]

If you examine your own mind carefully, you will see that the "I" only comes into existence when it is thought into being.

This statement contradicts itself.

[jupiviv]

Ancient Chinese wisdom says :

The other person is right ...you are wrong

This statement contradicts itself too. The person who says this is wrong if anybody disagrees with him.

[Kunga]

Here's the correct quote :

Enlightenment is to turn around and see my own mistake.
Others mistake is also my mistake.
Others are right even if they are wrong.
I'm wrong even if I am right.

(Old Master Chin Kung)

This has always been one of my favorite quotes...not an easy practice...

[David Quinn]

Here's the correct quote :

Enlightenment is to turn around and see my own mistake.
Others mistake is also my mistake.
Others are right even if they are wrong.
I'm wrong even if I am right.

(Old Master Chin Kung)

And just to ensure that the whole thing remains pure comedy, he offers this as a correction to other people's mistakes .....

If you examine your own mind carefully, you will see that the "I" only comes into existence when it is thought into being.

This statement contradicts itself.

Needless to say, I am using the word "you" advisedly.

-

[guest_of_logic]

If you examine your own mind carefully, you will see that the "I" only comes into existence when it is thought into being.

The concept of "I" only comes into existence when it is thought into being; the I in itself exists so long as one is conscious.

David: This thought-experiment is poorly-conceived because it doesn't really demonstrate what you want it to demonstrate. A radio can be left turned on so that a constant hissing sound emanates from it and then all of its parts can be gradually exchanged by new ones without the hissing sound ever being interrupted. It doesn't mean that the hissing sound has an unchanging essence.

David[cont]: Similarly, a spurt of water issuing upwards uninterruptedly with the parts of the fountain gradually being changed, or a blank desktop background on a computer screen shinging uninterrupetdly while all the computer parts are gradually changed, likewise doesn't demonstrate the existence of an unchanging essence.

guest_of_logic: Your objections fail, because they are based on undifferentiable, impersonal identities; whereas this does not apply to consciousness: it is impossible to differentiate the essential identity of one hiss that sounds a certain way from any other hiss that sounds the same; moreover, and which is another perspective on what I'm trying to say, it is impossible to be, in a subjectively conscious sense, that hiss. Likewise, it is impossible to differentiate the essential identity of a spurt of water issuing upwards from any other spurt of water issuing upwards; moreover, it is impossible to be, in a subjectively conscious sense, that spurt of water.

David: I have no idea what you are talking about. Given the context of this discussion, how are two hisses from two different radios not like two subjective consciousness from two different bodies?

In the very fact that they are not subjective: they have no "inner" which "looks out", and which could "look out" from a different form. One identical-sounding hiss can be substituted for another with no real change occurring, because they have no "inner-looking-out"; conversely, substituting the subjectivity of consciousness results in the "inner-looking-out" of the original body/mind now looking out from the new body/mind: a qualitative change.

guest_of_logic: Conversely, the essential subjectivity of consciousness is marked by its unique identity: its personal beingness, the looking-outness of its "I", as distinct from the looking-outness of the "I" of another body. So, whilst we can exchange any impersonal, undifferentiated hiss with any other impersonal, undifferentiated hiss, and not make or notice any difference, the same is not true for the subjectivity of consciousness: to exchange the personal subjectivity of the consciousness of one body/mind for that of another body/mind is to fundamentally change the identity and referent of the "I".

David: Nope, still no idea what you are talking about. You need to determine exactly what you want the "I" to mean. If it means pure subjective awareness (as distinct from all objects of consciousness), then it wouldn't matter in the slightest if two of them exchanged bodies. No one would know any difference. The "I", in this sense, is indeed utterly impersonal.

The original "I" would be "looking out" from the new body, and vice versa. The same cannot be said of the flames, since there is no "inner-looking-out" perspective involved in a flame by which to distinguish it at essence from any other flame.

However, the issue you are raising here and your conception of "personal being" suggests a different conception of "I" - namely, subjective awareness combined with the memories of the person involved. Either that or you seem to be imagining that a person's sense of identity comes from something other than his memories.

I think that identity is multi-layered/multi-faceted; I'm referring to the most bare, essential layer/facet.

Contend away, if that is what you want to do, but know that my outlook and my wisdom harbours not the slightest trace of materialism.

You believe that thought, consciousness, mind, etc can all be explained in terms of material causes - that's the essence of materialism.

[jupiviv]

Needless to say, I am using the word "you" advisedly.

Ha! Fair enough.

[David Quinn]

Contend away, if that is what you want to do, but know that my outlook and my wisdom harbours not the slightest trace of materialism.

You believe that thought, consciousness, mind, etc can all be explained in terms of material causes - that's the essence of materialism.

There are no such things as material causes. Have you not even understood this?

As for the rest of the post, my previous response remains sufficient. It adequately addresses your subsequent points.

You are creating confusion for yourself by treating the "I" as both "pure subjective awareness" and "pure subjective awareness-plus-content (e.g. memories, etc)" at the same time. As a result, you are manufacturing issues that aren't really there.

As always when it comes to these matters, there is a significant lack of clarity in your thinking which is causing you to go around and around in circles with no discernible progress. But then, deep down, this is what you really want.

If that's how you want to live your life, then that's fine, but I just wish you wouldn't use this forum for such masturbatory purposes.

-

[Unidian]

I am looking out from this particular body-window because I like to use hot sauce as aromatherapy. The other guy doesn't.

[guest_of_logic]

David: Contend away, if that is what you want to do, but know that my outlook and my wisdom harbours not the slightest trace of materialism.

guest_of_logic: You believe that thought, consciousness, mind, etc can all be explained in terms of material causes - that's the essence of materialism.

David: There are no such things as material causes. Have you not even understood this?

Which angle are you working here? Is it the angle of "from the absolute perspective, there are no causes, merely a seamless continuum"?

As for the rest of the post, my previous response remains sufficient. It adequately addresses your subsequent points.

You are creating confusion for yourself by treating the "I" as both "pure subjective awareness" and "pure subjective awareness-plus-content (e.g. memories, etc)" at the same time. As a result, you are manufacturing issues that aren't really there.

I thought up a good analogy for consciousness that might help explain why I see the flame and water fountain analogies as inadequate: consciousness is like a mobile phone. It has memory; it has processing capacity (thoughts); it can communicate with other mobile phones: this is the sense in which it is "pure subjective awareness-plus-content (e.g. memories, etc)". The core identity of the mobile phone, though, is the SIM card ("pure subjective awareness"). In mobile phones, SIM cards are interchangeable, but when you exchange them you change the fundamental identity of the phone.

The other interesting way in which this analogy works is in how a mobile phone can be switched off (general anaesthesia or a deep, dreamless sleep) but when it is switched back on again (conscious reawakening), the same SIM card is present (unless it's been exchanged, which would correspond to some advanced future technology by which the "pure subjective awareness" at the heart of consciousness is swapped into another mind). Without the SIM card, the phone has no identity, and cannot function.

[David Quinn]

David: Contend away, if that is what you want to do, but know that my outlook and my wisdom harbours not the slightest trace of materialism.

guest_of_logic: You believe that thought, consciousness, mind, etc can all be explained in terms of material causes - that's the essence of materialism.

David: There are no such things as material causes. Have you not even understood this?

Which angle are you working here? Is it the angle of "from the absolute perspective, there are no causes, merely a seamless continuum"?

That the duality of material and non-material doesn't really exist.

As for the rest of the post, my previous response remains sufficient. It adequately addresses your subsequent points.

You are creating confusion for yourself by treating the "I" as both "pure subjective awareness" and "pure subjective awareness-plus-content (e.g. memories, etc)" at the same time. As a result, you are manufacturing issues that aren't really there.

I thought up a good analogy for consciousness that might help explain why I see the flame and water fountain analogies as inadequate: consciousness is like a mobile phone. It has memory; it has processing capacity (thoughts); it can communicate with other mobile phones: this is the sense in which it is "pure subjective awareness-plus-content (e.g. memories, etc)". The core identity of the mobile phone, though, is the SIM card ("pure subjective awareness"). In mobile phones, SIM cards are interchangeable, but when you exchange them you change the fundamental identity of the phone.

The analogy doesn't work because SIM cards are not blank slates, but have content stored on them. It is this content which gives each SIM card its identity and its uniqueness.

The problem remains that you are wanting the "I" to be both "pure subjective awareness" (i.e. an impersonal blank slate which would make interchangeability possible) and "subjective awareness-plus-content" (not a blank slate, but containing the content which makes identity possible). If you were to decide on one of these conceptions or the other, your whole question would collapse and that would be the end of the matter. It only remains alive because of your continued engagement with this double-think.

-

[Gurrb]

technicalities killed the cat.

[guest_of_logic]

David: There are no such things as material causes. Have you not even understood this?

guest_of_logic: Which angle are you working here? Is it the angle of "from the absolute perspective, there are no causes, merely a seamless continuum"?

David: That the duality of material and non-material doesn't really exist.

Call it what you will; if you don't like the implications of "materialist" then we can find another word for it - my point is that you don't believe in any dimension to life and consciousness beyond "physical" (quoting the word for your sensitivities) causes.

guest_of_logic: I thought up a good analogy for consciousness that might help explain why I see the flame and water fountain analogies as inadequate: consciousness is like a mobile phone. It has memory; it has processing capacity (thoughts); it can communicate with other mobile phones: this is the sense in which it is "pure subjective awareness-plus-content (e.g. memories, etc)". The core identity of the mobile phone, though, is the SIM card ("pure subjective awareness"). In mobile phones, SIM cards are interchangeable, but when you exchange them you change the fundamental identity of the phone.

David: The analogy doesn't work because SIM cards are not blank slates, but have content stored on them. It is this content which gives each SIM card its identity and its uniqueness.

I have no idea how the subjectivity of consciousness works, and whether it truly is a "blank slate". The point of the analogy, though, doesn't lie there - the point is to capture what I mean by subjective consciousness having an identity as entailed by its being a "looking-out-ness".

The problem remains that you are wanting the "I" to be both "pure subjective awareness" (i.e. an impersonal blank slate which would make interchangeability possible) and "subjective awareness-plus-content" (not a blank slate, but containing the content which makes identity possible). If you were to decide on one of these conceptions or the other, your whole question would collapse and that would be the end of the matter. It only remains alive because of your continued engagement with this double-think.

David, you're not showing any flexibility of mind. Personal identity is in many ways contextual. In some contexts we include our bodies; in others we include only our personalities; in yet others we include our conscious awareness plus our thoughts and memories; and in some contexts, we include only the core of our subjective consciousness. That I recognise different aspects of personal identity is no "double-think", and is no argument against my position.

[David Quinn]

David: There are no such things as material causes. Have you not even understood this?

guest_of_logic: Which angle are you working here? Is it the angle of "from the absolute perspective, there are no causes, merely a seamless continuum"?

David: That the duality of material and non-material doesn't really exist.

Call it what you will; if you don't like the implications of "materialist" then we can find another word for it - my point is that you don't believe in any dimension to life and consciousness beyond "physical" (quoting the word for your sensitivities) causes.

I believe in any dimension which exists, whether it be physical or non-physical.

guest_of_logic: I thought up a good analogy for consciousness that might help explain why I see the flame and water fountain analogies as inadequate: consciousness is like a mobile phone. It has memory; it has processing capacity (thoughts); it can communicate with other mobile phones: this is the sense in which it is "pure subjective awareness-plus-content (e.g. memories, etc)". The core identity of the mobile phone, though, is the SIM card ("pure subjective awareness"). In mobile phones, SIM cards are interchangeable, but when you exchange them you change the fundamental identity of the phone.

David: The analogy doesn't work because SIM cards are not blank slates, but have content stored on them. It is this content which gives each SIM card its identity and its uniqueness.

I have no idea how the subjectivity of consciousness works, and whether it truly is a "blank slate". The point of the analogy, though, doesn't lie there - the point is to capture what I mean by subjective consciousness having an identity as entailed by its being a "looking-out-ness".

Pure "looking-out-ness" doesn't have any identity in the sense you mean. It is like a pure mirror. Accordingly, if tonight our own subjective awarenesses or "looking-out-nesses" were somehow swapped during our sleep, we would both wake up not knowing the difference.

The problem remains that you are wanting the "I" to be both "pure subjective awareness" (i.e. an impersonal blank slate which would make interchangeability possible) and "subjective awareness-plus-content" (not a blank slate, but containing the content which makes identity possible). If you were to decide on one of these conceptions or the other, your whole question would collapse and that would be the end of the matter. It only remains alive because of your continued engagement with this double-think.

David, you're not showing any flexibility of mind. Personal identity is in many ways contextual. In some contexts we include our bodies; in others we include only our personalities; in yet others we include our conscious awareness plus our thoughts and memories; and in some contexts, we include only the core of our subjective consciousness. That I recognise different aspects of personal identity is no "double-think", and is no argument against my position.

While that's true, it isn't relevent. There is a world of difference between flitting from one conception of the self to another over successive moments and that of mashing two contradictory conceptions together in the same instant of time. The former is natural behaviour and perfectly valid; the latter is double-think.

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[overmyhead]

I haven't the patience to read all the debate, but I will chance a reply anyhow.

Why does one's subjective consciousness inhabit a particular body and not another?

The question makes presumptions which create paradoxes, namely, that subjective consciousness is unique, subject to possession, and resides somewhere.

It does seem that consciousness is tied to an individual. But it is simply the case that consciousness which involves an individual is consciousness which relates to that individual. This carries to the specific case of consciousness of the individual which is me the observer. Consciousness of me the observer doing something is necessarily tied to consciousness of me the observer. It does not make sense to conceive of consciousness which is dependent on Ramses II as me the observer occurring in any context other than Ramses II as me the observer. It's so easy to complicate this very simple understanding by trying to integrate it with mundane concepts such as mind, brain, soul, life/death, ownership, me/other, etc. Just don't.

I see no reason why consciousness need be tied to an individual. Not even in the case of human consciousness. The individual is found every time it is looked for, and so the notion is borne that the individual is always there. But is this so?

[cousinbasil]

I haven't the patience to read all the debate, but I will chance a reply anyhow.

Why does one's subjective consciousness inhabit a particular body and not another?

The question makes presumptions which create paradoxes, namely, that subjective consciousness is unique, subject to possession, and resides somewhere.

It does seem that consciousness is tied to an individual. But it is simply the case that consciousness which involves an individual is consciousness which relates to that individual. This carries to the specific case of consciousness of the individual which is me the observer. Consciousness of me the observer doing something is necessarily tied to consciousness of me the observer. It does not make sense to conceive of consciousness which is dependent on Ramses II as me the observer occurring in any context other than Ramses II as me the observer. It's so easy to complicate this very simple understanding by trying to integrate it with mundane concepts such as mind, brain, soul, life/death, ownership, me/other, etc. Just don't.

I see no reason why consciousness need be tied to an individual. Not even in the case of human consciousness. The individual is found every time it is looked for, and so the notion is borne that the individual is always there. But is this so?

Stop pretending to be God.

[cousinbasil]

If you examine your own mind carefully, you will see that the "I" only comes into existence when it is thought into being. And in your case, it evidentally also involves a further projecting of this "I" onto all experiences.

Doesn't this presuppose an entity that thinks the "I" into being? It's a pretty concept, David, but this is bootstrapping.

[David Quinn]

The entity is just the brain itself. In other words, the "I" is a useful fiction that the brain creates as part of its strategy for dealing with the world.

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[Talking Ass]

Bah humbug.

[David Quinn]

Cling to a crumb and an entire feast is missed out....

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[cousinbasil]

The entity is just the brain itself. In other words, the "I" is a useful fiction that the brain creates as part of its strategy for dealing with the world.

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So your contribution to philosophy boils down to: "The brain thinks, therefore I is."